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Implementing the Anticancer Clauses of the Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act
On April 15, 1977, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
proposed to ban the use of saccharin in prepackaged foods and as a
tabletop sweetener.' The FDA's proposed regulation cited a recent
Canadian study which, in the FDA's opinion, "confirmed what ear-
lier American studies have suggested: that saccharin poses a signifi-
cant risk of cancer in humans."' The FDA'§ withdrawal of sac-
charin's approval as a food additive is popularly viewed as predi-
cated on the anticancer clause (also known as the Delaney Amend-
ment) in the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.'
Public reaction to the proposed ban has been tumultuous. The
flurry of Congressional activity following the FDA's announcement
promises to revitalize the controversy over the social costs and bene-
fits of the anticancer clauses.4 That reexamination is clearly in
order, but it would be a mistake if its focus were skewed by preoccu-
pation with the saccharin controversy. The federal government has
1 42 Fed. Reg. 19996 (1977). The Commissioner proposed to permit the submission of new
drug applications for the marketing of saccharin as a single ingredient over-the-counter drug.
Id. at 20004. That saccharin may be considered a human drug as well as a food additive was
apparently recognized by the FDA as early as 1942. FooD DRUG Cos. L. REP. (CCH)
70,051.39 (1969) (FDA TC38, July 27, 1942). For example, saccharin is used by persons
afflicted with diabetes, obesity, reactive hypoglycemia, and carbohydrate-induced hyperlipe-
mia.
2 42 Fed. Reg. 19996 (1977). In the Canadian study twenty-one of 200 rats whose mothers
were fed saccharin and that were subsequently weaned to the same diet developed bladder
tumors, while only one control rat developed bladder tumors. Id. at 20000. This study, how-
ever, did not convincingly show that rats exposed to saccharin only after birth display more
bladder tumors than rats not so exposed. 296 NEW ENoLAND J. MED. 1348 (1977). Evidence
of a positive correlation between saccharin intake and the incidence of bladder tumors in
human males surfaced after the FDA's proposal to withdraw the substance. See Howe,
Bunch, Miller, Morrison, Gordon, Weldon, Chambers, Fodor & Winsor. Artificial Sweeteners
and Human Bladder Cancer, 1977 LANcEr 578. For criticism of this study see 1977 LANCET
592.
3 The anticancer clause applicable to food additives is found in § 409(c)(3)(A) of the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act [hereinafter cited as FDCA], 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3) (A)
(1970). FDA's proposed withdrawal of saccharin is actually based not only on the anticancer
clause, but also on the general safety clause of section 409. 42 Fed. Reg. 20002 (1977).
1 During the first session of the 95th Congress fifty-seven bills were introduced to modify
the anticancer clause in some manner; sixty bills were introduced to deal specifically with
saccharin. Telephone interview with Jan Hardy of the Office for Legislative Services, Food
and Drug Administration. The bill that has received the most attention is H.R. 5166, intro-
duced by Representative Martin, which would permit the agency to balance the benefits of
certain food additives against their demonstrated health risks. Id. Deferring final resolution
of the saccharin controversy, the Senate on September 15, 1977, passed S. 1750, which
imposes an eighteen month moratorium on action to ban saccharin. FOOD CHEMicAL NEWS,
September 19, 1977 at 46.
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been regulating toxic substances since 19061 and an anticancer
clause has been part of the statute since 1958.6 Discussion of the
anticancer clauses cannot ignore the history of FDA regulation of
carcinogenic substances.
The purpose of this comment is to examine the problems that
have arisen in implementing the anticancer clauses. The FDA's
record in regulating carcinogens has been marked by long delays,7
inconsistent results,8 and exposure to political pressure.' These diffi-
The first major effort was the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1906, 34 Stat. 786
(1906). For a history of food and drug legislation in the United States, see Turner, Principles
of Food Additive Regulation, in 2 CONSUMER HEALTH AND PRODUCTS HAZARDS 289 (S. Epstein
& R. Grundy eds. 1974).
1 The Food Additives Amendment of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-929, 72 Stat. 1784, added
FDCA § 409, which contains an anticancer proviso. FDCA § 409(c)(3)(A), 21 U.S.C. §
348(c)(3)(A) (1970).
1 A 1962 study of Violet 1, a color additive, suggested that it might be carcinogenic. See
Mannell, Grice & Allmark, Chronic Toxicity Studies on Food Colours, 14 J. PHARMACY &
PHARMACOLOGY 378 (1962). The provisional certification of the color was not terminated until
1973. 38 Fed. Reg. 9077 (1973).
Evidence of the carcinogenicity of nitrofurans (an animal drug) first surfaced in 1966.
See J.E. Morris, The Carcinogenic Activity in the Rat of Some Derivatives of 5-Nitrofuran
(1966) (unpublished dissertation at the University of Wisconsin). While a proposed regulation
has been issued that would withdraw nitrofurans from the market, 41 Fed. Reg. 19906 (1976),
no action has yet been taken. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 510.515(a)(4-5), (b)(15), (b)(17)(ii), (c)(8-10),
556.290, 558.15(g)(1-2), and 558.262 (1977).
Cyclamate-treated animals developed a high incidence of lymphosarcomas during a
study conducted by FDA in 1950. These findings were not reported until 1969. Although there
have been differences of opinion regarding the significance of these tumors, the possibility of
carcinogenicity certainly should have been raised. See Regulatory Policies of the FDA, Hear-
ing before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 91 Cong., 2d Sess.
108 (1970). Cyclamates were removed from the market on August 27, 1970. 35 Fed. Reg.
13644-45 ((1970)(revoking 21 C.F.R. §§ 2.121(m), 3.75, 130.40, and 130.43 (1970)).
Evidence that saccharin might be carcinogenic was reported in 1951. See Fitzhugh Nel-
son & Frawley, A Comparison of the Chronic Toxicity of Synthetic Sweetening Agents, 40 J.
AM. PHARMACEUTICAL Ass'N 583 (1951).
The provisional listing of F.D. & C. Red No. 2 was terminated because no study was
"available to resolve the uncertainties concerning the safety of F.D. & C. Red No. 2." 41 Fed.
Reg. 5824 (1976). However, F.D. & C. Red No. 40, the dye that is expected to replace Red
No. 2, "has not been subjected to the kinds of tests some experts consider necessary to
establish its safety." Color Additives: Is Successor to Red Dye No. 2Any Safer?, 191 SCIENCE
832 (1976). The Canadian government, evaluating essentially the same data as that available
to the FDA, removed Red No. 40 from the market, but continued to permit the use of Red
No. 2. See Canada Ministry of Health & Welfare, Canadian Position on the Food Colour
Amaranth (News Release, Feb. 2, 1976). Allied Chemical, holder of the patent on Red No.
40, has submitted test results that showed that six of 400 test mice developed premature and
unexpected malignant lymphomas after 41 weeks of a 76-week feeding study. FDA News
Release, FOOD DRUG Cos. L. RaP. (CCH) T 41,588 (Feb. 28, 1976). An interagency working
group evaluating F.D. & C. Red No. 40 recently concluded that the FDA should delay decision
until further tests are conducted. See Interim Report Working Group on F.D. & C. Red No.
40 (January 19, 1977) (unpublished FDA report).
See, e.g., Boffey, Death of a Dye, N.Y. Times, Feb. 29, 1976 (Magazine), at 9:
It had been a rough few months for Alexander M. Schmidt, Commissioner of Food and
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culties have been due in large part to underlying problems of statu-
tory interpretation, to the failure of the FDA to issue regulations
and establish standards, and to the inherent difficulty of drawing
legal conclusions on the basis of inconclusive and often conflicting
scientific evidence.
The comment will first delineate the statutory framework in
which the anticancer clauses operate. Second, it will discuss the
problem of defining and identifying carcinogens. The last section of
the comment will examine the scope of the anticancer clauses.
I. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act'0 establishes the
procedures and criteria for the regulation of chemicals found in food.
Section 301 prohibits the introduction or delivery for introduction
into interstate commerce of any adulterated food, the adulteration
of any food in interstate commerce, the receipt and delivery or prof-
fered delivery of any adulterated food in interstate commerce, and
the manufacture of any adulterated food." Section 402 of the Act
defines adulteration.' 2 The statute, as enacted in 1938, classifies all
Drugs, as he worried over the controversial color additive Red No. 2. First, the General
Accounting Office and Senator Gaylord Nelson charged that his agency had dillydallied
for 15 years without making a final decision on the safety of Red No. 2 and thereby
exposed the public to needless risk. Next, the Health Research Group, a Ralph Nader
affiliate that had led the charge against Red No. 2 for four years, complained that serious
safety questions were still unresolved. Then came a grueling appearance on CBS-TV's
Face the Nation where reporters badgered Schmidt to explain why he had not taken Red
No. 2 off the market ....
The political pressures are due in large part to the increasing incidence of certain types
of human cancer. The trend has been widely noted. See, e.g., S. Doc. No. 9, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 31 (1970). The recognition that many cancers are caused by exposure to chemicals in
the environment has spawned additional concern. See Cairns, The Cancer Problem, 233
SCIENTIFIc AM. 64 (1975); Epstein, Environmental Determinants of Human Cancer, 34
CANCER RESEARCH 2425 (1974); WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, PREVENTION OF CANER (Tech.
Rep. Ser. No. 276, 1964).
21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1970).
" 21 U.S.C. § 331 (1970).
12 21 U.S.C. § 342 (1970). Section 402 provides, in relevant part:
A food shall be deemed to be adulterated-
(a)(1) If it bears or contains any poisonous or deleterious substance which may
render it injurious to health; but in case the substance is not an added substance such
food shall not be considered adulterated under this clause if the quantity of such sub-
stance in such food does not ordinarily render it injurious to health; or (2) (A) if it bears
or contains any added poisonous or added deleterious substance (other than one which
is (i) a pesticide chemical in or on a raw agricultural commodity; (ii) a food additive;
(iii) a color additive; or (iv) a new animal drug) which is unsafe within the meaning of
section 346 of this title, or (B) if it is a raw agricultural commodity and it bears or
contains a pesticide chemical which is unsafe within the meaning of section 346a(a) of
this title, or (C) if it is, or if it bears or contains, any food additive which is unsafe within
the meaning of section 348 of this title . ...
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"poisonous and deleterious substances" as either "added" or "not
added.' ' 13 Foods containing "not added" or "naturally occurring"' 4
substances are not to be considered adulterated unless the FDA
shows that the presence of the substance renders the food
"ordinarily injurious to health."' 5 "Added" poisonous or deleterious
substances are to be deemed unsafe, and the food in which they are
present adulterated, if the FDA shows that the substance "may
render [the food] injurious to health."'" Section 406,' 7 however,
specifically requires that the FDA consider the practicality of re-
moving an added substance from the food, and permits the estab-
lishment of tolerances for substances that are essential in food pro-
duction or that cannot be avoided through good manufacturing
practice.
In order to increase the Act's effectiveness in protecting the
public health, Congress in 1958 enacted the Food Additives Amend-
ment.'8 The Amendment sets up an independent framework in sec-
tion 409' for the regulation of "food additives," as defined in section
201(s) of the Act." The provisions of sections 402 and 406, regulating
13 Id.
," "Naturally occurring" is not a statutory term. It is a term used by the FDA as synon-
omous with "not an added substance." See, e.g., 39 Fed. Reg. 42743 (1974).
" § 402(a)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(1) (1970).
" The FDA has the burden of proving a chemical unsafe under the "poisonous and
deleterious" provisions of the Act. See T. CHRISTOPHER & W. GOODRICH, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON FOOD AND DRUG LAWS 531 (1973).
,7 21 U.S.C. § 346 (1970). Section 406 provides:
Any poisonous or deleterious substance added to any food, except where such sub-
stance is required in the production thereof or cannot be avoided by good manufacturing
practice shall be deemed to be unsafe for purposes of the application of clause (2) (A) of
section 342(a) of this title; but when such substance is so required or cannot be so
avoided, the Secretary shall promulgate regulations limiting the quantity therein or
thereon to such extent as he finds necessary for the protection of public health, and any
quantity exceeding the limits so fixed shall also be deemed to be unsafe for purposes of
the application of clause (2) (A) of section 342(a) of this title. While such a regulation
is in effect limiting the quantity of any such substance in the case of any food, such food
shall not, by reason of bearing or containing any added amount of such substance, be
considered to be adulterated within the meaning of clause (1) of section 342(a) of this
title. In determining the quality of such added substance to be tolerated in or on different
articles of food the Secretary shall take into account the extent to which the use of such
substance is required or cannot be avoided in the production of each such article, and
the other ways in which the consumer may be affected by the same or other poisonous
or deleterious substances.
" Food Additives Amendment of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-929, 72 Stat. 1784.
21 U.S.C. § 348 (1970).
20 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (1970). Section 201(s) provides in relevant part:
The term "food additive" means any substance the intended use of which results
or may reasonably be expected to result, directly or indirectly, in its becoming a compo-
nent or otherwise affecting the characteristics of any food (including any substance
[44:817
Anticancer Clauses of FDCA
"added" substances, remained in the Act; "added substance" and
"food additive" are not synonymous terms.
Section 409(a) provides that a food additive shall be considered
unsafe within the meaning of Section 402, and therefore adulter-
ated, unless a regulation is in effect that prescribes the permissible
terms of its use.21 The procedures and standards governing the issu-
ance of such regulations are detailed in subsections (b) through (h)
of section 409. Ordinarily a petition proposing a regulation will be
filed under section 409(b) by the manufacturer of the additive.2
Reports of investigations "made with respect to the safety for use
of such additive" must be included in the petition.2 3 The statute
requires the FDA to issue a regulation or deny the petition. 24 Section
409(c)(3) provides, in part:
(3) No such regulation shall issue if a fair evaluation of the
data before the Secretary-
(A) fails to establish that the proposed use of the food
additive, under the conditions of use to be specified in the
regulation, shall be safe: Provided, That no additive shall be
deemed safe if it is found to induce cancer when ingested by
man or animal, or, if it is found, after tests which are appropri-
ate for the evaluation of food additives, to induce cancer in
man or animal ....
intended for use in producing, manufacturing, packing, processing, preparing, treating,
packaging, transporting, or holding food; and including any source of radiation intended
for any such use), if such substance is not generally recognized, among experts qualified
by scientific training and experience to evaluate its safety, as having been adequately
shown through scientific procedures (or, in the case as [sic] a substance used in food
prior to January 1, 1958, through either scientific procedures or experience based on
common use in food) to be safe under the conditions of its intended use ...
2 21 U.S.C. § 348(a) (1970). Section 408(a) provides:
A food additive shall, with respect to any particular use or intended use of such
additives, be deemed to be unsafe for the purposes of the application of clause (2) (C)
of section 342(a) of this title, unless-
(1) it and its use or intended use conform to the terms of an exemption which
is in effect pursuant to subsection (i) of this section; or
(2) there is in effect, and it and its use or intended use are in conformity with,
a regulation issued under this section prescribing the conditions under which such
additive may be safely used.
While such a regulation relating to a food additive is in effect, a food shall not, by reason
of bearing or containing such an additive in accordance with the regulation, be consid-
ered adulterated within the meaning of clause (1) of section 342(a) of this title.
2 FDCA § 409(b)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 348(b)(1) (1970), provides that "any person" may file
a petition. The Secretary may propose a regulation on his own initiative. 21 U.S.C. § 348(d)
(1970).
21 FDCA § 409(b)(2)(E), 21 U.S.C. § 348(b)(2)(E) (1970).
2 FDCA § 409(c)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(1) (1970).
22 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1970).
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The general safety clause contained in subsection (c)(3)(A)
places the burden of establishing the safety of a chemical on the
proponent of the regulation. 6 The safety clause has generally been
construed to incorporate a risk-benefit standard: the FDA must
determine whether "the benefits which the chemical produces out-
weigh the costs of its restricted use."-" Section 409(c)(4)2 authorizes
the FDA to promulgate regulations that establish the maximum
quantity of a substance that may be used in food. Since it is gener-
ally recognized that many toxic substances may be safely used in
low dosages,2" the setting of such tolerances is consistent with the
general safety standard.
The anticancer proviso to the general safety clause" provides
that carcinogenic substances are to be regulated under a standard
different from that under which other toxic additives are regu-
lated.3' There are essentially two related differences between the
respective standards of the safety and anticancer clauses. First, the
anticancer clause does not permit risk-benefit analysis; the clause
has been interpreted "to prohibit the use of any additive which
under any conditions induces cancer in any strain of test animal. 32
The preclusion of risk-benefit balancing reflects a categorical con-
gressional judgment that no benefits outweigh the health risks
posed by the presence in food of carcinogenic food additives. Sec-
ond, the language of the anticancer clause forecloses the setting of
tolerance levels for carcinogenic additives. This important differ-
ence between the safety and anticancer clauses reflects the lack of
a known threshold below which a safe tolerance for a carcinogenic
26 The Act is silent as to burdens of proof, but support for the position that the manufac-
turer is to be allocated the burden is found in both the legislative history and the Administra-
tive Procedure Act. Congress intended the Food Additives Amendment to require the proces-
sor of a new and unproven additive to prove that ingestion of the substance by human beings
was safe. S. Rep. No. 2422, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1958). Section 7(d) of the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1970), states that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by
statute, the proponent of a rule or order has the burden of proof." Since the statute requires
the manufacturer to petition for approval of an additive, the manufacturer is the proponent
of such a regulation. See also 21 C.F.R. § 12.87(d)-(e) (1977).
2 Hess & Clark, Div. of Rhodia, Inc. v. FDA, 495 F.2d 975, 993-94 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(4) (1970).
29 See generally T. LOOMiS, ESSENTIALS OF TOXICOLOGY 13 (1975); W. LOWRNCE, OF
AcCEprABLE RbsK: SCIENCE AND iE DETERMINATION OF SAFETY 39 (1976).
20 § 409(c)(3)(A), 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1970) (quoted in text at note 25 supra).
" The anticancer clauses in the Act were modeled after the recommendations of a sym-
posium held by the International Union Against Cancer in August 1956. See Report of Sym-
posium on Potential Cancer Hazards from Chemical Additives and Contaminants to
Foodstuffs, 13 ACTA UNIO INTERNATIONALES CONTA CANcauM 170, 188 (1957).
32 Bell v. Goddard, 366 F.2d 177, 181 (7th Cir. 1966).
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substance can be assumed. 3
After the enactment of the Food Additives Amendment, Con-
gress adopted the Color Additive Amendment of 1960, 31 and the
Animal Drug Amendments of 1968 .3 These amendments establish
' Secretary Flemming stated during testimony on the Color Additives Amendment of
1960:
The clause is grounded on the scientific fact of life that no one, at this time, can tell us
how to establish for man a safe tolerance for a cancer-producing agent. . ..
So long as the outstanding experts in the National Cancer Institute and the Food
and Drug Administration tell us that they do not know how to establish with any
assurance at all a safe dose in man's food for a cancer-producing substance, the principle
in the anticancer clause is sound.
Color Additives: Hearings before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. 501 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Color Additive Hearings].
It is not simply the absence of data indicating how much or how little of a carcinogen
will produce cancer in human beings that supports the no-threshold hypothesis. These posi-
tive findings, as summarized by the World Health Organization Scientific Group, support the
theory:
(1) the self-replicating nature of the cancer cell;
(2) the work of Druckrey and others, which has been interpreted to indicate summation
of irreversible effects in carcinogenesis (this has been expressed by Druckrey in the
equation Dtn= K 3 where n is greater than 1);
(3) evidence from experiments on tumour initiation and promotion in skin carcinogene-
sis indicating lasting change induced by one tumour-initiating event;
(4) the fact that cancer can occur in response to chemicals, even after single doses, long
after their disappearance from the body;
(5) the possibility that cancer may result from mutation in a somatic cell.
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, ASSESSMENT OF THE CARCINOGENICITY AND MUTAGENICITY OF
CHEMICALS 9-10 (Tech. Rep. Ser. No. 546, 1974).
The equation in (2) indicates that the mean latency period for a tumor to develop is
inversely proportional to the amount of total dosage. If the equation is confirmed by experi-
mental methods, it suggests that even extremely small doses can induce tumors in a suffi-
ciently long period of time. However, it is possible that the length of time necessary for the
tumor to develop would extend beyond the life span of the organism. See Druckrey &
Schmihl, Quantitative Analyse der experimentellen Krebserzeugung, 49 DIE NATURWISSEN-
SCHAFTEN 217 (1962). See also J. ARCOS, M. ARGUS & G. WOLF, CHEMICAL INDUCTION OF CANCER
436-38 (1968); P. DAUDEL & R. DAUDEL, CHEMICAL CARCINOGENESIS AND MOLECULAR BIOLOGY
135 (1966).
The WHO Scientific Group also discussed the support for the existence of a threshold.
The possibility that the cancer-inducing event is reversible is supported by the decline in the
risk of developing lung cancer in ex-smokers. Cellular mechanisms for the repair of DNA may
result in the correction of the cancer-initiating event. The possibility also exists that a single
tumor cell may be eliminated by immunological mechanisms. For further discussion of the
merits of basing the anticancer clauses on the principle that no threshold exists for chemical
carcinogens, see HEALTH RESEARCH GROUP, CANCER PREVENTION AND THE DELANEY CLAUSE
(1973); Blank, The Delaney Clause: Technical Naivete and Scientific Advocacy in the Forma-
tion of Public Health Policies, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1084 (1974); Epstein, The Delaney
Amendment, 3 ECOLOGIST 424 (1973); Epstein, The Delaney Amendment, 2 PREVENTIVE MED.
140 (1973); Oser, An Assessment of the Delaney Clause After 15 Years, 2 PREVENTIVE MED.
150 (1973); Saffiotti, Comments on the Scientific Basis for the Delaney Clause, 2 PREVENTIVE
ME. 125 (1973); Schneiderman & Mantel, The Delaney Clause and a Scheme for Rewarding
Good Experimentation, 2 PREVENTIVE ME. 165 (1973).
3' Pub. L. No. 86-618, 74 Stat. 397.
"' Pub. L. No. 90-399, 82 Stat. 342.
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independent frameworks for the regulation of color additives and
new animal drugs. Like section 409, the color additive and animal
drug provisions each contain a safety and anticancer clause .31 How-
ever, section 512(d)(1)(H) 37-called the DES Amendment because
it was enacted to allow the continued use of diethylstilbestrol
(DES)-enables the agency to permit the use of carcinogenic animal
drugs if no residue of the drug can be found in any edible portion of
the treated animal.
1I. DEFINING A CARCINOGEN
One of the most difficult problems in the implementation of the
anticancer clause is the very basic one of ascertaining which chemi-
cals are carcinogenic. The Act prohibits the approval of any chemi-
cal that "is found to induce cancer when ingested by man or animal,
or. . . is found, after tests which are appropriate for the evaluation
of the safety of food additives, to induce cancer in man or animal.":"
Three major issues are raised by this definition. The first concerns
the meaning of the term "induce"; the second, the required methods
of carcenogenicity testing; and the third, the evaluation of test re-
sults.
A. The Meaning of "Induce": Primary and Secondary Carcinogens
The verb "induce" ordinarily means "to bring on or to bring
about" or "to effect, '39 and there is no indication that Congress
intended the term to have a specialized or technical meaning in the
anticancer clause. One would expect the clause to apply to any
chemical the ingestion of which results in the formation of tumors,
regardless of the mechanism by which the formation occurs.'" Nev-
ertheless, the FDA has in practice distinguished between "primary"
and "secondary" carcinogenic effects.
There are basically two kinds of "secondary" carcinogenic ef-
' Color Additive Amendment: FDCA § 402(c), 21 U.S.C. § 342(c) (1970) (safety clause);
FDCA § 706(b)(5)(B), 21 U.S.C. § 376(b)(5)(B) (1970) (anticancer clause).
Animal Drug Amendments: FDCA § 501(a)(5), 21 U.S.C. § 351(a)(5) (1970) (safety
clause); FDCA § 512(d)(1)(H), 21 U.S.C. § 360b(d)(1)(H) (1970) (anticancer clause).
' 21 U.S.C. § 360b(d)(1)(H) (1970).
See text at note 25 supra. The words "carcinogen" and "carcinogenic" are not used in
the Act.
WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INTERNATMNAL DICTIONARY 1269 (2d ed. 1956).
" Cf. Bell v. Goddard, 366 F.2d 177, 180-82 (7th Cir. 1966),-in which the court, though
not directly facing the issue, drew no distinction between chemicals which "cause" and those
which "incite" cancer, and concluded that the clause "is generally intended to prohibit the
use of any additives which under any conditions induce cancer. . . ." Id. at 181.
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fects. First, a chemical itself noncarcinogenic may react with chemi-
cals commonly found in food to form carcinogens. Nitrites, which
are used as preservatives and are commonly present in cured meat
and fish, exemplify this category of secondary carcinogens. Al-
though nitrites themselves do not cause tumors in experimental
animals, 41 studies have shown that under certain conditions nitrites
can react with chemical compounds known as amines to form po-
tently carcinogenic nitrosamines.42 Amines are present in a wide
variety of foods,4 3 and there is evidence that concurrent ingestion of
nitrites and the appropriate amine or amide by man may produce
the conditions necessary for formation of nitrosamines. Tumors
have been induced in animals after concurrent ingestion of nitrites
and certain secondary amines,14 and one type of nitrosamine was
found in the stomachs of human subjects fed a combination of ni-
trites and amines.4 5
FDA officials have said that the anticancer clause is not applic-
able to ingested nitrites. They reason that in order for the clause to
apply, nitrites must by themselves cause cancer. Under the FDA's
view, the anticancer clause would apply only if it were demonstrated
that nitrites added to fish or meat produced nitrosamines in the food
itself. The clause does not apply, the FDA claims, to nitrites which
upon ingestion might react with amines and produce nitrosamines
in the body. 6 Adoption of this restrictive interpretation enabled the
FDA to base its proposed regulation of nitrites on the safety clause,
and thereby to propose restrictions upon the use of nitrites as an
alternative to complete prohibition, 7 a drastic step the agency was
" See H.R. Rep. No. 1338, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1972). See generally E. Williams & R.
Harkins, The Nitrite Controversy 24 (1974) (unpublished Grocery Manufacturers Association
monograph).
42 See Lijinsky & Epstein, Nitrosamines as Environmental Carcinogens, 225 NATuRE 21
(1970).
"I Amines or amides are found in a large number of drugs, food additives, and natural
products. Although many amines in food can be eliminated, the amines that occur naturally
and those produced during the cooking of food cannot. Regulation of Food Additives and
Medicated Animal Feeds: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of
the House Comm. on Government Operations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 132 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Regulation of Food Additives Hearings].
" See generally H.R. Rep. No. 1338, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1972).
"S Magee, Toxicity of Nitrosamines, 9 FOOD Cos. ToxIcOLOoY 215 (1971).
" Regulation of Food Additives Hearings, supra note 43, at 540-41; E. Williams & R.
Harkins, supra note 41, at 24-27.
, The FDA stated that "the use of nitrites and nitrates should be limited to only those
uses which are essential in inhibiting the growth of C. botulinum and for obtaining the
essential characteristics of cured meats at this time." 37 Fed. Reg. 23457 (1972). The proposed
regulation would appear to prohibit the use of nitrites for solely "cosmetic" purposes, i.e., to
give meats their red color. For a discussion of whether nitrites are necessary to safeguard
against C. botulinum, see H. WELLORD, SowING THE WIND 176 (1972).
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unwilling to take.48
A chemical may also be considered a secondary carcinogen if it
does not directly produce tumors, but instead causes a disruption
of some bodily function that in turn induces tumor formation. An
example is the animal nutrient selenium. In three of six studies, test
animals fed high dosages of selenium developed tumors. 9 It was
found that selenium in high doses produced liver damage in the test
animals and that the liver damage was responsible for the develop-
ment of tumors. The FDA concluded on this evidence that selenium
does not induce cancer." The agency, therefore, regulates selenium
under the safety clause and permits use of the chemicals as a nu-
trient in the feed of poultry and swine at levels that the FDA feels
will not endanger human health.51
The FDA's position that selenium is safe in low dosages yet
dangerous at higher levels might appear to be inconsistent with the
premise of the anticancer clauses that no safety threshold for
cancer-causing agents can be identified. The agency was careful,
however, to justify its action in terms of the purposes of the antican-
cer clauses. The clauses, it pointed out, "are predicated on the
theory that, since we do not know the mechanisms of carcinogenesis,
even one molecule of a carcinogen should not be allowed into the
food supply."5 Where the mechanism is known, however-as the
FDA was certain it knew the mechanism by which selenium induced
cancer in the test rats-and where it is clear that the mechanism is
triggered only by abnormally high dosages, 3 the reasoning behind
11 The Director of the Bureau of Foods has stated that if the FDA were to "carry through
the Delaney philosophy, it would mean banning the curing of meat in this country." FOOD
CHEMICAL NEWS, Sept. 18, 1972, at 26. He stated that at present there is no substitute for
nitrites and estimated that about 80% of the swine meat in the United States is cured with
nitrites, amounting to approximately 40% of the nation's meat supply. Id. Nevertheless, the
FDA recently announced its intention to reexamine the use of nitrites in poultry, and the
agency's Chief Counsel stated that it would not search for "legal mechanisms for saving
nitrites." FOOD CHEMICAL NEWS, May 16, 1977, at 3.
' 38 Fed. Reg. 10458, 10459-60 (1973).
The Commissioner was of the opinion that:
The anticancer clauses do not apply in the case of an agent that (1) occurs naturally in
practically all foods, (2) is used in a manner such that the natural level in food is not
increased, (3) has a definite hepatotoxic effect/no-effect level, and (4) has a possible
carcinogenic effect which is associated only with the hepatotoxic effect.
38 Fed. Reg. 10460 (1973). The "hepatotoxic effect" referred to is liver damage.
s' 21 C.F.R. § 573.920 (1977).
5' 38 Fed. Reg. 10460 (1973).
3 There is a general controversy as to whether the use of a very high dosage results in
an increased incidence of tumors because of stress, alteration of the hormonal balance, or
overloading of the metabolic pathways. See, e.g., Weil, Guidelines for Experiments to Predict
the Degree of Safety of a Material for Man, 21 ToxicOLOGY & APPLIED PHARMACOLOGY 194
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the anticancer clauses does not apply.
The rationale of the selenium decision could become a signifi-
cant loophole in the Delaney policy if not applied with great care.
In the selenium case the FDA did not spell out in any detail the
basis for its conclusions that the hepatotoxic effect identified was
attributable solely to the dosage levels, and that the carcinogenic
effects were associated only with the hepatotoxic effect. When there
is affirmative evidence that an additive, by whatever mechanism,
induces cancer when ingested by animals, the FDA should not set
tolerances unless it is satisfied beyond doubt that it fully under-
stands the mechanism of carcinogenesis, and that the mechanism
can never be triggered in humans by ingestion of any amount of the
substance that could conceivably reach humans. Such a standard
will seldom be satisfied in practice. 54
The FDA perhaps had little choice in the selenium case because
selenium must remain on the market. Selenium in low doses is
essential for normal growth and metabolism in animals, "5 and ani-
mals cannot produce it endogenously. The agency's treatment of
selenium illustrates the need in some cases to accommodate the
facially absolute demands of Delaney with the necessities of food
production and processing.
B. Scientific Standards: Testing for Carcinogenicity
The most difficult task faced by the FDA in the implementa-
tion of the anticancer clause is that of determining when the evi-
(1972). The use of high doses has been defended. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Health, Education
and Welfare, Report of the Advisory Panel on Carcinogenicity, Teratogenicity and Mutagen-
icity (1969) (quoted in Epstein, The Delaney Amendment, 3 ECOLOGIsT 424, 425 (1973)).
" The issue raised by the selenium case has surfaced in connection with FDA's consider-
ation of furazolidone, a new animal drug. In support of a request for a hearing, manufacturers
of the drug have cited the selenium decision for the proposition that a chemical shown to
increase the incidence of malignant tumors in test animals is not necessarily a carcinogen
within the meaning of the anticancer clauses. Rhodia, Inc., Memorandum in Support of
Request for Hearing 4, In the Matter of Furazolidone, No. 76N-0172 (FDA, filed August,
1976). The manufacturers claim that high dosages of furazolidone disrupt the hormonal
balance of rats and that the resulting imbalance, in turn, induces cancer. 41 Fed. Reg. 19907,
19911 (1976). In its Notice of Opportunity for Hearing on the proposal to withdraw approval
of furazolidone, the Director of the Bureau of Veterinary Medicine of the FDA, after noting
that the claimed hormonal effect was not supported by the evidence, stated:
Even if a hormonal effect had been adequately demonstrated and established as the
sole operant in the development of mammary tumors in the female rats studied, the
mechanism would have to be sufficiently defined. Then, if the mechanism in rodents
was not applicable to humans, it would be necessary to determine that the nitrofurans
would not cause a different hormonal effect in humans by using an appropriate animal
species to establish a "no-hormonal-effect" level.
Id. at 19912. Such skepticism is appropriate, yet was noticeably absent in the selenium case.
5 See generally NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, SELENIUM IN NuTRrTION (1971).
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dence of a chemical's carcinogenic effects is sufficiently strong to
warrant labeling the chemical a carcinogen. If a hypothetical chemi-
cal produced malignant neoplasms in one hundred per cent of the
test animals treated with the chemical while none of the control
animals developed malignancies, the inference that the chemical
"induces cancer" would be irresistible, assuming reproducible, well-
performed, and well-controlled experiments. It is not surprising,
however, that virtually none of the evaluations performed by the
FDA has been as simple and unequivocal as the hypothetical case.
Most have provoked prolonged and at times bitter disputes," in part
because there has seldom been scientific agreement on the validity
of the tests employed, or the significance of the test results.57 The
FDA has never promulgated standards for determining whether a
chemical is a carcinogen.58
See Hutt, A Regulator's Viewpoint, in NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, How SAFE IS
SAFE? THE DESIGN OF POLICY ON DRUGS AND FoOD ADDITIVES 116 (1974).
11 Scientists' difficulty in agreeing on the carcinogenicity of a chemical is evidenced by
the 1976 Summary Statement of the Temporary Committee for the Review of Data on Carcin-
ogenicity of Cyclamate:
The Committee concludes that the present evidence does not establish the carcinogen-
icity of cyclamate or its principal metabolite, cyclohexylamine, in experimental animals.
No conclusion could be reached concerning the question of cyclamate's potential carcin-
ogenicity in humans due to the short post-exposure observation time, the insensitivity
of epidemiologic studies to detect relatively small changes in cancer incidence, and other
factors.
The Committee expresses concern over the statistically significant increase in tu-
mors in cyclamate-treated animals from several studies; however, the interpretation of
these results is confounded by the nature of the test procedures or animal strain em-
ployed. The presence of tumors of the urinary tract in other animal studies, though not
in statistically significant numbers, is cause for additional concern.
The Committee notes the relatively limited sensitivity of current bioassay systems.
Although no chemical can be proven unequivocally to lack carcinogenicity with these
systems, one with a significant carcinogenic hazard for humans could escape detection.
Div. of Cancer Cause & Prevention, Nat'l Cancer Inst., Report of the Temporary Committee
for the Review of Data on Carcinogenicity of Cyclamate 1 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Cycla-
mate Report].
11 Throughout the literature there can be found fragmentary suggestions of what such
standards could be. See, e.g., FDA Advisory Committee on Protocols for Safety Evaluation,
Panel on Carcinogenesis Report on Cancer Testing in the Safety Evaluation of Food Additives
and Pesticides, 20 TOXICOLOGY & APPLIED PHARMACOLOGY 419 (1971) (never officially adopted
by the FDA). In discussion of a recent regulation, the Commissioner recommended that the
Report of the Panel on Carcinogenesis serve as guidance in developing laboratory protocols.
42 Fed. Reg. 10412, 10417-18 (1977).
The procedure for the evaluation of certain animal drugs has been discussed by FDA
officials in a paper presented at a scientific symposium. See Kolbye & Perez, Human Safety
Considerations From the Use of Anabolic Agents in Food Producing Animals (1975) (unpub-
lished paper presented at FAO/WHO Symposium on the Use of Anabolic Agents in Animal
Production and Its Public Health Aspects, held March 17-19, 1975, in Rome).
An attempt to promulgate toxicological criteria for additives in 1971 was unsuccessful.
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1. Appropriate Tests. The Act gives the FDA broad discretion
in determining the testing methods to be employed. Carcinogenicity
can be determined by testing via ingestion by man or animal,59 or
by other "appropriate" tests not involving ingestion at all. The in-
duction of a neoplasm following exposure to a chemical carcinogen
is poorly understood;" the processes by which cancer results from
the incorporation of suspected carcinogens in an animal's diet is
obscured by the play of numerous inherent variables. 1 These diffi-
culties have led to much dispute concerning the validity of individ-
ual testing techniques, and a number of basic issues remain unre-
solved.
The first hurdle is to identify those chemicals that require long-
term testing. Adequate testing requires that experimental animals
be treated with the compound over their life span-a time-
consuming and costly procedure.82 Consequently, a great number of
chemicals used in food have not been tested for carcinogenicity. 3 It
See FOOD CHEMICAL NEws, May 10, 1971, at 17. The need for such standards has been
conceded publicly by one FDA official. FOOD CHEMICAL NEWS, Sept. 8, 1975, at 10.
The FDA has recently announced the development of criteria for evaluating the safety
of flavoring substances used as food ingredients. The criteria are contained in a technical
report prepared under contract for the Bureau of Foods, FDA, by the ad hoc Select Committee
on Flavor Evaluation Criteria of the Life Sciences Research Office, Federation of American
Societies for Experimental Biology. The criteria have not yet been officially adopted. See 42
Fed. Reg. 10065 (1977).
The FDA has issued guidelines for the chemical and technological requirements of food
additive petitions. They summarize requirements dealing with such subjects as the chemical
identity and assay methods of proposed compounds. The guidelines, however, do not set forth
any requirements for safety testing. Bureau of Science, FDA, FDA Guidelines for Chemistry
and Technology Requirements of Food Additive Petitions (Aug. 1966).
1' The recognition that useful toxicologic screening could be accomplished in species
other than man was based upon a report submitted to the Congress by the National Cancer
Institute. Mider, The Role of Certain Chemicals and Physical Agents in the Causation of
Cancer, in Color Additive Hearings, supra note 33, at 45, 53.
See S. ROBBINS, PATHOLOGIC BASIS OF DISEASE 134 (1974).
' See generally CANADA MINISTRY OF HEALTH & WELFARE, THE TESTING OF CHEMICALS FOR
CARCINOGENICITY, MUTAGENICITY AND TERATOGENICITY (1973). The inherent variables include
nutritional, endocrinal, immunological, genetic, and environmental factors. The difficulties
that these variables pose for the regulator in identifying a carcinogen were recognized soon
after the passage of the Food Additive Amendments of 1958. See, e.g., President's Science
Advisory Committee, Report of the Panel on Food Additives (1960).
12 See generally Peck, Design of Experiments to Detect Carcinogenic Effects of Drugs in
CARCINOGENESiS TESTING OF CHEMICALS 1 (L. Golberg ed. 1974). The cost of testing one chemi-
cal for carcinogenesis in one species averages approximately $75,000.00. Gehring, Rowe &
McCollister, Toxicology: Cost/Time in 1 Dow CHEMICAL CO., CHEMICALS, HuMA HEALTH AND
THE ENVIRONMENT 32, 38 (1975).
11 See National Advisory Food and Drug Committee, FDA, Transcript of Proceedings of
June 29-30, 1976, at 2-54 (remarks of Alexander Schmidt, Commissioner, FDA). See generally
Comptroller General Report, Federal Efforts to Protect the Public from Cancer-Causing
Chemicals Are Not Very Effective (June 16, 1976).
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has been estimated, for example, that only twenty per cent of the
new animal drugs approved by the FDA have undergone long-term
testing."
Full implementation of the anticancer clause would involve
long-term testing of all substances submitted for FDA approval.
The FDA, however, cannot conduct the tests itself, and is appar-
ently unwilling to impose such a heavy burden on manufacturers. 5
Even if long-term testing of all chemicals cannot realistically be
required, the FDA should avoid hit-or-miss application of the
clause, perhaps by adopting guidelines for the determination of
which chemicals require long-term testing." This problem might be
alleviated by the recent development of short-term in-vitro tests67
" FDA Toxicology Advisory Committee, Minutes of Meeting, (Oct. 4, 1976) at 5
[hereinafter cited as Toxicology Committee].
0 The Act does not expressly set forth any testing requirement, nor does it specify how
the FDA is to obtain the experimental data upon which to base its regulations. However, the
Food Additives Amendment does require that full reports of any investigations made with
respect to the safety of a chemical be included in a food additive petition. FDCA §
409(b)(2)(E), 21 U.S.C. § 348(b)(2)(E) (1970). See also FDCA § 409(c)(3), 21 U.S.C. §
348(c)(3) (1970) (requiring a "fair evaluation of the data before the Secretary"). Thus, the
Secretary determines what tests are adequate to document a chemical's safety. Since the Act
dictates that the manufacturer of a new chemial bear the burden of proving the chemical's
safety, see note 26 supra, the manufacturer is effectively compelled to conduct the required
test or the Secretary will deny the food additive petition.
In practice, most testing is conducted by the manufacturer. Legislation has been pro-
posed which would require third-party testing of food chemicals by independent testing
laboratories. See 119 Cong. Rec. 1174 (1973). See generally Nat'l Cancer Inst., Report of the
Director's ad hoc Committee on Testing for Environmental Chemical Carcinogens (Aug.
1973) (unpublished report, National Cancer Inst.) (hereinafter cited as Director's Report].
The FDA does in fact test a few substances itself. See Ad hoc Committee on Testing for
Environmental Chemical Carcinogens, Minutes of Meetings of May 31 and June 1, 1973, in
Director's Report, at 4-5.
11 The FDA has not set forth any official guidelines. Director's Report, supra note 65, at
1. At a recent FDA Advisory meeting one FDA staff member catalogued the factors generally
considered in determining whether long-term testing of animal drugs is required:
Several factors determine whether additional testing of the parent drug is required. If
the compound or any residue in food is a suspect carcinogen, lifetime testing in two
rodent species is always required. A compound is considered a suspect carcinogen if it
is structurally related to known carcinogens or it is expected to be possibly transformed
to a known carcinogenic compound when ingested by humans. In addition, the biological
activity of a kind sometimes associated with carcinogenicity may categorize a compound
as a suspect carcinogen. For example, if it produced thyroid hyperplasia or bile duct
proliferation in subchronic studies, then long-term tests are required.
Toxicology Committee, supra note 64, at 6. The promulgation of guidelines would eliminate
the arbitrary results often obtained when regulators simply "eyeball" the data. See Color
Additives: Botched Experiment Leads to Banning of Red Dye No. 2, 191 ScrENcE 450 (1976).
11 One short-term test uses the bacteria Salmonella as an indicator of DNA damage. The
test is based on the theory that cancer is caused by mutations. Experimental data indicates
a high correlation between carcinogenicity and mutagenicity. In one study 90% of 175 known
carcinogens were mutagenic in the short-term test, including almost all of the known human
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for carcinogenicity screening. If in-vitro testing proves reliable,
it would aid greatly in the determination of which compounds
should be subjected to long-term animal tests. A program could be
instituted under which chemicals yielding positive short-term test
results could be approved only after long-term testing. 8 The FDA
could also require manufacturers of chemicals that have been ap-
proved without long-term testing to submit to periodic reevalua-
tions and to conduct additional tests if necessary. 9
There is also great need for the development of guidelines speci-
fying testing conditions. Many FDA evaluations have been based on
a multitude of different experiments conducted under different cir-
cumstances. Few if any of the individual studies have been reprod-
uced.70 The necessity for guidelines would be diminished if the re-
sults of these different tests were somewhat uniform. In fact, how-
ever, results of these experiments have varied greatly.71 Such guide-
lines cannot be promulgated, however, until certain policy decisions
are made regarding the desired degree of anticancer effort. It is well
documented that certain testing procedures are more sensitive than
others, in the sense that certain tests are more likely than others to
yield a positive result.72 For example, carcinogenicity tests using the
transplacental route of administration, whereby testing is begun in
the parent generation and carried over to the newborn generation,
appear to be more sensitive than other test systems.7 3 Some experts
carcinogens. See McCann & Ames, Detection of Carcinogens as Mutagens in the Salmo-
nella/Microsome Test: Assay of 300 Chemicals, 73 PROc. NAT'L AcAD. Sci. 950 (1976). The
test is simple, inexpensive, and fast. See FOOD CHEMICAL NEWS, Feb. 14, 1977, at 2.
" Such an approach is suggested in Subcomm. on Environmental Carcinogenesis, Nat'l
Cancer Advisory Bd., General Criteria for Assessing the Evidence for Carcinogenicity of
Chemical Substances (June 2, 1976) (unpublished report, U.S. Dep't of Health, Education,
and Welfare).
11 Although not specifically authorized by the Act, such conditional regulations should
be within the scope of the FDA's broad rulemaking power under FDCA § 701(a), 21 U.S.C. §
371(a) (1970). This seems to be the purpose of the cyclic review procedures that FDA is
developing. See FooD CHEMICAL NEWS, Oct. 11, 1976, at 20.
" The evaluation of the carcinogenicity of saccharin conducted by the National Academy
of Sciences for the FDA was based on eleven different studies. Food and Nutrition Bd., Nat'l
Research Council, Safety of Saccharin and Sodium Saccharin in the Human Diet (1974)
(unpublished report, National Academy of Sciences).
Evaluation of cyclamate by the National Cancer Institute for the FDA was based on
twenty-five different studies. See Cyclamate Report, supra note 57.
"' See, e.g., Cyclamate Report, supra note 57 (nineteen studies on cyclamate with nega-
tive results; six studies with positive or inconclusive results).
72 There are many factors which may affect the sensitivity and results of a test. Such
factors include the route of administration, dosage, frequency of exposure, strain of animal,
species, age, diet, immunological status, and duration of the experiment. See C'NADA MINIS-
TRY OF HEALTH & WELFARE, supra note 61.
71 See Shubik, Interpretation of Test Results in Terms of Significance to Man, in
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have advocated the use of the most sensitive test;74 others have
urged that the testing mimic conditions of human consumption as
much as possible.75 The former position would seem more consistent
with the policy of the anticancer clause, although the use of an
extremely sensitive test raises the risk that the carcinogenic effects
discovered may be the product of the experimental design.76 In any
event, the issue must be squarely faced as a prerequisite to the
promulgation of any guidelines.
Although the adoption of test guidelines need not foreclose reli-
ance upon other relevant data, there is a danger that such guidelines
might discourage the pursuit of other lines of research aimed at
developing improved methods of carcinogenicity testing.7 The like-
lihood of that danger materializing, however, would be small-any
guidelines adopted must of course be subject to continuous review,
and university laboratories and medical centers would be under no
compulsion to restrict their work. In addition, should tests con-
ducted under the prescribed guidelines indicate that a chemical is
hazardous, the manufacturer would have an incentive to disprove
those findings, and, in the process, conceivably might develop new
and more accurate testing methods.
The promulgation of test guidelines would serve at least three
purposes. First, tests conducted according to standardized proce-
dures would be more easily reproducible. Reproducibility would
help to eliminate unreliable data.78 Second, guidelines would inform
manufacturers of the kind of testing that must be conducted. By
instructing the manufacturers that the use of certain tests will en-
hance the chances for approval, the FDA could increase industry
incentives to test chemicals adequately. 79 Equally important, guide-
CARCINOGENESIS TESTING OF CHEMICALS 45 (L. Golberg ed. 1974).
71 E.g., Chemicals and the Future of Man: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Executive
Reorganization and Government Research of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 44, 50 (1971) (statement of Dr. S. Epstein) [hereinafter cited as Epstein
Statement].
" See, e.g., Weil, supra note 53.
7' See text and notes at notes 51-54 supra.
n See E. BURGER, PROTECTING THE NATION'S HEALTH 6 (1976); FOOD CHEMICAL NEWS, Sept.
8, 1976, at 10.
19 For a discussion of the importance of reproducibility in carcinogenesis testing, see
Subcomm. on Environmental Carcinogenesis, Nat'l Cancer Advisory Board, Transcript of
Proceedings at 50-90 (March 3, 1976).
11 One industry counsel has remarked:
Without a more carefully defined criteria, we are like players in a ball game where new
rules are imposed as the game progresses and the referees impose penalties for that which
was not a violation when the game started.
M. Sayer, Food Regulation: Quo Vadis 4 (Jan. 20, 1976) (unpublished paper presented at the
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lines would better enable manufacturers to determine the costs of
safety approval at an early developmental stage °.8 Third, standard-
ized testing would streamline the approval process and would help
the FDA cope with the vast number of untested chemicals now on
the market. Although there are dangers attendant upon the use of
testing guidelines, such guidelines are, as a practical matter, essen-
tial to the full and efficient implementation of the anticancer
clauses.8 1
2. Evaluation of Data. The anticancer clause of section 409
provides that "no additive shall be deemed safe if it is found to
induce cancer .... "82 The anticancer clause, therefore, applies
only if there is affirmative evidence that the chemical induces can-
cer. 83 The mere fact that the chemical may produce tumors in cer-
tain test animals does not conclusively establish carcinogenicity1 4
New York State Bar Association Annual Meeting, Food, Drug & Cosmetic Law Section) (on
file with the University of Chicago Law Review).
See Epstein Statement, supra note 74, at 57.
' The National Cancer Institute has developed a comprehensive protocol for carcinoge-
nesis testing, Nat'l Cancer Institute, Guidelines for Carcinogen Bioassay in Small Rodents
(Tech. Rep. Ser. No. 1, NCI-C6-TR-1, February, 1976). Since these guidelines are general in
nature (they may apply to occupational, environmental, and experimental carcinogens), they
may not be suitable in all respects for application to food additives.
21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1970).
If there is some evidence that an additive might be carcinogenic but that evidence does
not warrant concluding that the additive "induces cancer," the safety of the additive would
be evaluated under the standards of the safety clause. Two recent FDA withdrawals of
suspected carcinogens were based on the safety clause-the withdrawal of the food additive
diethylpyocarbonate (DEPC), theoretically capable of combining with other ingredients to
form the carcinogen urethan, 37 Fed. Reg. 3060, 15426 (1972); and the withdrawal of mercap-
toimidazoline, a compound which could possibly rearrange chemically to form ethylene-
thiourea, a carcinogen. 38 Fed. Reg. 10116, 33072 (1973). According to the FDA, neither action
was based on the anticancer clause because the scientific evidence indicated only a possibility
that the compounds were carcinogenic. See FDA, Evolution of Chemical Analysis in Relation
to the Regulation of Foods, Drugs and Cosmetics in Agriculture-Environmental and Con-
sumer Protection Appropriations for 1975, Hearings before the Subcomm. on Agriculture-
Environmental and Consumer Protection of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 8, at 218 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Appropriations Hearings].
The application of the safety standard would permit the use of a suspected carcinogen if
the expected benefits of its use outweigh the risk that it causes cancer. See FOoD CHEMICAL
NEws, July 1, 1974, at 10 (discussion of the role of economic benefit considerations in FDA's
regulation of carcinogenic substances). To illustrate, if a preservative for which there is no
economically realistic substitute is suspected of being carcinogenic, the social utility of its
continued use would counsel against its removal from the market; however, if a food color
were suspected, the relatively low social utility of its use would not sufficiently counterbal-
ance the risk that it might cause cancer.
" See Color Additive Hearings, supra note 33, at 62 (statement of Secretary Flemming):
It has been suggested that once a chemical is shown to induce a tumor in a single rat,
this forecloses further research and forever forbids the use of the chemical in food. This
is not true. The conclusion that an additive "is found to induce cancer when ingested
The University of Chicago Law Review
Unlike scientists who can eschew reliance on insufficient data,85
however, the agency must make decisions on the basis of incomplete
or inconclusive evidence.8'
It would be impossible for the FDA to spell out with specificity
the quantum of evidence that will suffice for concluding that a
chemical is carcinogenic. Nevertheless, the present confusion and
uncertainty concerning sufficiency of scientific evidence is at least
partly avoidable. The FDA should clarify the criteria for evaluating
test results. The difficulties encountered in test evaluation are in-
deed formidable. Consider, for example, the variety of ways in
which chemicals can affect tumorigenesis:
The response to a tumorigenic substance may consist of (1) an
increased incidence of tumors of a type commonly seen in the
control animals, (2) the development of a type of tumor not
seen in the control animals, or (3) a combination of the occur-
rence of a different type of tumor and an increased incidence
of one of several types of tumors seen in controls. In some
experiments the only manifestation of an effect consists of (4)
an earlier occurrence of tumors in the treated animals than in
the controls, the incidence being the same in both. In yet an-
other variation the only effect seen may consist of (5) an in-
crease in the number of tumors per animal, the number of
tumor-bearing animals being the same .... 11
Moreover, tumors differ in their structural characteristics-for ex-
ample, a chemical may cause the formation of histopathologically
benign tumors, thus raising the difficult question whether the in-
duction of benign tumors suggests that the chemical is carcino-
genic .88
by man or animal" is a scientific one. The conclusion is reached by competent scientists
using widely accepted scientific testing methods and critical judgment. An isolated and
inexplicable tumor would not be a basis for concluding that the test substance produces
cancer.
I The reluctance of scientists to rely on questionable data was evidenced when the Food
and Drug Administration's Toxicology Advisory Committee concluded that the experiments
on F.D. & C. Red No. 2 were not of the quality necessary to demonstrate the safety of Red
No. 2. Scientists and Bureaucrats: A Clash of Cultures on FDA Advisory Panel, 191 ScIN' cE
1244 (1976).
" The legislative history of the Food Additives Amendment of 1958 clearly indicates that
absolute certainty regarding the safety of a substance is not requisite to its remaining on the
market. Reasonable certainty of the chemical's safety will suffice. See S. REP. No. 2422, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1958).
81 D'Aguanno, Interpretation of Test Results in Terms of Carcinogenic Potential and the
Test Animal: The Regulatory Point of View, in CARCINOGENESIS TESTING OF CHEMicALS 41 (L.
Golberg ed. 1974).
" The role that benign tumors play in the progression of tumor growth is unknown. See
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There have been many proposals of methods to systematically
determine which tumorigenic effects justify labeling a chemical car-
cinogenic."9 The proposals generally attempt to develop a strict sci-
entific standard for carcinogenicity, and are not necessarily suitable
for regulatory decision making. However, the FDA could develop a
system of rebuttable presumptions based on its evaluation of the
significance of different kinds of tumorigenic effects. 0 Such a sys-
tem would facilitate reasoned decision making at the formal hearing
level9 and would aid judicial review. Perhaps the most important
benefit of such a system would be the guidance that it would provide
to the FDA staff and the manufacturers in the informal actions that
make up the bulk of the FDA's work. 2
generally L. FOULDS, NEOPLASTIC DEVELOPMENT (1969). Some benign tumors appear to remain
benign for the lifetime of the host while others diagnosed at one point as benign may later
become malignant. I. BERENBLUM, CARCINOGENESIS AS A BIOLOGICAL PROBLEM 45 (1974). Moreo-
ver, the characterization of a particular tumor (as either benign or malignant) may be a
difficult task. See, e.g., National Cancer Advisory Board on Environmental Carcinogens,
transcript of meeting of Feb. 4, 1976, at 40-69.
"' See, e.g., CANADA MINISTRY OF HEALTH & WELFARE, supra note 61; Nat'l Cancer Insti-
tute Ad Hoc Committee on the Evaluation of Low Levels of Environmental Chemical Carcin-
ogens, Report to the Surgeon Gen. on Environmental Carcinogens (1970), in Chemicals and
the Future of Man: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Executive Reorganization and Govern-
ment Research of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 180-98
(1971); Advisory Panel on Carcinogenicity of Pesticides, Carcinogenicity of Pesticides, in
Report of the Secretary's Commission on Pesticides and Their Relationship to Environmental
Health 459-506 (Dec. 5, 1969); FAO/WHO JOINT EXPERT COMMITTEE ON FOOD ADDITIVES,
EVALUATION OF CARCINOGENIC HAZARDS OF FOOD ADDITIVES (WHO Tech. Rep. Ser. No. 220,
1961); FDA Advisory Commitee on Protocols for Safety Evaluation, supra note 58 at 419-38;
Food Protection Committee, Problems in the Evaluation of Carcinogenic Hazards from the
Use of Food Additives (Nat'l Acad. Sci.-Nat'l Resources Council Publication No. 749, Dec.
1959); INTERNATIONAL UNION AGAINST CANCER, CARCINOGENICITY TESTING (UICC Tech. Rep.
Ser., vol. 2, 1. Berenblum ed. 1969); WHO, ASSESSMENT OF THE CARCINOGENICrTY AND MUTAGEN-
ICITY OF CHEMICALS 9-10 (Tech. Rep. Ser. No. 546, 1974); WHO, PREVENTION OF CANCER, (Tech.
Rep. Ser. No. 276, 1964); WHO, SCIENTIFIC GROUP, PRINCIPLES FOR THE TESTING AND EVALUA-
TION OF DRUGS FOR CARCINOGENICITY (Tech. Rep. Ser. No. 426, 1969).
0 The authority to develop and implement such principles can be inferred from FDCA
§ 409(c)(5)(C), 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(5)(C) (1970), and FDCA § 701(a), 21 U.S.C. § 371(a)
(1970).
11 Only one formal hearing has been held by the FDA in its attempts to remove carcino-
gens from the market. See In the Matter of "Tend-A-Wate" (paste containing 15 mg. die-
thylstilbestrol per 0.2 cc), No. FDC-D-49 (FDA, March 10, 1961). A number of hearings will
soon be held regarding other possible carcinogens. See 41 Fed. Reg. 1804, 52105 (1976) (DES);
41 Fed. Reg. 29896 (1976) (F.D. & C. Red No. 2); 41 Fed. Reg. 19906 (1976) (furazolidone).
Determining the appropriate standards to measure a chemical's safety will be an issue
in all of these hearings. See Petitioner's Memorandum on Burden of Proof at 3, In the Matter
of F.D. & C. Red No. 2, No. 76C-0033 (FDA, filed Aug. 23, 1976).
02 "During fiscal year 1975, FDA received 176 food additive petitions and took 197 actions
(some prior year carry-over)." Regulatory Reform-Vol. II: Federal Power Commission, Food
and Drug Administration: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of
the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 407 (1976).
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The opinion of the D.C. Circuit in the case of Environmental
Defense Fund v. Environmental Protection Agency93 suggests the
propriety-and desirability-of such standards. The Environmental
Protection Agency, an agency similarly involved in carcinogenicity
testing, has developed certain cancer principles9 4 to aid it in assess-
ing the risks posed by environmental carcinogens. Although the
EPA's principles have been subjected to criticism," the court in
Environmental Defense Fund held that the Agency may properly
rely upon such principles. Rejecting the argument "that the 'cancer
principles' that EPA relied on improperly biased the agency's open-
minded consideration of the evidence,"96 the court noted that the
manufacturer had been afforded ample opportunity to rebut the
presumptions embodied in the cancer principles. 7 The opinion
praised "EPA's specific enunciation of its underlying analytic prin-
ciples, derived from its experience in the area [since such specificity
provides] . . . meaningful notice and dialogue, enhances the ad-
During the same year the FDA received an estimated 2,142 new animal drug applications and
completed an estimated 2,251 reviews. Agriculture and Related Agencies Appropriations for
1977: Hearings before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 5, at 271 [hereinafter cited as 1977 Appropriations Hearings].
Standards are needed to guide the informal adjudicatory process. Courts and commenta-
tors have often emphasized the need to structure the exercise of administrative discretion.
See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C. Cir.
1971). See generally K. DAVIs, DIscREIoNARY JusTIcE (1969).
- 548 F.2d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
11 The following is a partial listing of the principles:
(1) A carcinogen is any agent which increases tumor induction in man or animals.
(2) Well-established criteria exist for distinguishing between benign and malignant
tumors; however, even the induction of benign tumors is sufficient to characterize a
chemical as a carcinogen.
(5) Carcinogenesis is characterized by its irreversibility and long latency period follow-
ing the initial exposure to the carcinogenic agent.
(7) The concept of a "threshold" exposure level for a carcinogenic agent has no practi-
cal significance because there is no valid method for establishing such a level.
(8) A carcinogenic agent may be identified through analysis of tumor induction results
with laboratory animals exposed to the agent, or on a post hoc basis by properly con-
ducted epidemiological studies.
(9) Any substance which produces tumors in animals must be considered a carcino-
genic hazard to man if the results were achieved according to the established parameters
of a valid carcinogenesis test.
Respondent's Brief, Proposed Findings and Conclusions on Suspension at 31, In re Shell
Chemical Co., FIFRA Docket Nos. 145 et al. (EPA, 1974).
11 See, e.g., Council for Agricultural Science & Technology, The Environmental Protec-
tion Agency's Nine 'Principles' of Carcinogenicity, Report No. 5r in 1977 Appropriations
Hearings, supra note 92, at 412.
,1 548 F.2d at 1006.
97 Id.
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ministrative process and furthers reasoned agency decision-
making.""8 The FDA should emulate the imaginative approach
taken by the EPA.
III. THE AMBIT OF THE ANTICANCER CLAUSES
At first blush the Act seems to clearly define the domain of the
anticancer clauses. The clauses are applicable to food additives,
color additives, and new animal drugs. Several problems have
arisen, however, in determining the coverage of the anticancer
clauses. The most important of these controversies surrounds the
definition of a "food additive". Other significant problems concern
two of the statutory exemptions from the food additive definition
and the proper interpretation of the DES Amendment.
A. Food Additives: The Problem of Unavoidability
Food additive is defined in section 201(s) of the Act as "any
substance the intended use of which results or may reasonably be
expected to result, directly or indirectly, in its becoming a compo-
nent or otherwise affecting the characteristics of any food." ' 0
" Id. at 1007.
" It is not at all clear whether the clauses apply to the withdrawal of regulations. In Rossi
v. Finch, [1970 Transfer Binder] FOOD DRUG Cos. L. REP. (CCH) 40391 (N.D. Cal.), the
court states that "the Delaney Amendment is operative only upon petitions which are filed
to determine the safety of new food additives." This reading would seem to foreclose applying
the anticancer clause in proceedings to withdraw a food additive regulation. Section 409,
however, permits amendment or repeal of decisions if new evidence exists with respect to the
additive. 21 U.S.C. § 348(h) (1970). Although the applicability of the anticancer clause in
withdrawal proceedings is not specifically addressed in the statute (the primary concern of
Congress being the establishment of a premarketing clearance scheme), this circumstance
should not preclude the application of the clause. It would indeed be anomalous if the FDA
could weigh the benefits of the use of a carcinogen, or assume a safe tolerance for a carcinogen,
merely because the carcinogenic substance had been approved years earlier on the basis of
now obsolete testing.
The recognition that scientific standards for determining the safety of food chemicals will
change greatly over time has led the FDA to consider periodic reassessments of food and color
additives. FOOD CHEMICAL NEWS, Oct. 11, 1976, at 20. With the institution of such procedures,
withdrawal of food additive regulations may become more common.
1" 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (1970). See generally Krinsky, Regulation of Food Additives Never
Added: An Odd Mixture of Science and Law, 37 MONT. L. REv. 198 (1976); Annot., 21 A.L.R.
Fed. 314 (1974). In attempting to illustrate the scope of the definition, both the House and
Senate Reports listed three categories of additives: intentional, incidental, and accidental.
See SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, FOOD ADDITIvEs AMENDMENT OF 1958, S.
REP. No. 2422, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1958) [hereinafter cited as SENATE ADDITIVES
REPORT]; HousE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, FOOD ADDrrivEs AMENDMENT
OF 1958, H.R. REP. No. 2284, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1958). Intentional additives were
described as those substances deliberately added to food, and "incidental" additives as those
substances not intentionally added, but which may "reasonably be expected" to enter food.
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Substances can enter food in a variety of ways. First, they can
be introduced during the manufacturing and processing stages of
food production. Second, substances can enter food during storage
and distribution; for example, substances can migrate into food
from surrounding packaging materials. Third, substances can enter
food through the ecological food pyramids as a result of extensive
environmental contamination. Finally, adulteration can occur
through such natural processes as fungus growth. Substances inten-
tionally used during manufacturing, processing, storage or distribu-
tion are usually "food additives," since in most cases it could have
been anticipated that the substances would enter the food. 01 The
status of substances that enter food through environmental contam-
ination or natural processes is more problematic.
In United States v. Ewig Brothers Co.,10 2 the Seventh Circuit
held that residues of the chemical pesticides DDT and dieldrin
found in smoked chubs were food additives within the meaning of
the Act. Although the basis for the court's holding is less than
clear, 3 the court appears to have concluded that DDT and dieldrin
SENATE ADDITIVES REPORT at 5. Indirect or incidental additives comprise the largest number
of chemicals in food. There are approximately 2,000 regulated indirect additives. See
NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, CHEMICALS AND HEALTH: REPORT OF THE PANEL ON CHEMICALS
AND HEALTH OF THE PRESIDENT'S SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE 67 (1973). It has been estimated
that there are approximately 10,000 indirect food additives. See FDA Food Additives Five
Year. Program, Indirect Additives Review 2 (FY-77-81, Aug. 3, 1976). The legislators felt that
both intentional and incidental additives were included in the statutory definition of food
additives. SENATE ADDITIVES REPORT at 5. On the other hand, accidental additives-
"substances which may accidentally get into food, as for example, paints or cleaning solutions
used in food processing plants"-were not thought to be within the definition of food addi-
tives. Id.
"' The FDA has adopted no standards for determining whether a substance can reasona-
bly be expected to become a component of food. FOOD CHEMICAL NEWS, March 28, 1977, at 4.
The FDA has stated that when a chemical is found in a very low level in the food contact
article, it may be possible to predict that there is "no reasonable expectation of migration
into food based on theoretical considerations peculiar to the particular product and use." 40
Fed. Reg. 40534 (1975). Such language suggests that FDA would consider adopting the theo-
retical extrapolation method now used in estimating the significance of animal drug residues.
See text and notes at notes: 161-63 infra. The FDA specifically rejected the use of the method
in its regulations of polychlorinated biphenyls, a food additive. Letter from Alan Bennett,
FDA Assistant Chief Counsel for Enforcement, to Stephen M. Truitt, reprinted in FOOD
CHEMICAL NEWS, Oct. 6, 1976, at 16. The Society of the Plastics Industry recently submitted
a petition to the FDA proposing the application of the theoretical extrapolation method to
packaging materials. See FOOD CHEMICAL NEWS, April 4, 1977, at 22-24. If adopted, the
proposal would in effect exclude migrants from the definition of food additive if the level of
migration is below a specified level.
"u 502 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 945 (1975) (noted in 21 VILL. L.
REV. 140 (1975)).
"3 The case is complicated by the fact that DDT and dieldrin are pesticide residues.
Section 402(a) (2) (c) of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(2)(c) (1970), contains a proviso to the effect
that pesticide residues remaining on processed agricultural products shall not be deemed
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were "incidental" additives because the presence of pesticides in the
food could be traced to human agency. Because Congress had not
restricted the scope of the term "food additive" to substances delib-
erately added, 104 the court reasoned, the pesticides fell within the
statutory language. 0 5 The implications of the decision are stagger-
ing. DDT and dieldrin, both proven carcinogens,' are ubiquitous
environmental contaminants that enter food through the ecological
food pyramids.'07 Were the Ewig Brothers decision carried to its
logical extreme all foods containing these pesticides-including
most foods of animal origin"'-would be removed from the market
by force of law, for the anticancer proviso to section 409 forbids the
issuance of a regulation permitting the marketing of carcinogenic
food additives.
The FDA, however, has taken the position that it may, under
section 406, set tolerance levels for additives the presence of which
in food is unavoidable but that do not satisfy the standards for
issuance of a regulation under section 409.111 The agency's position
cannot be squared with the statute. The tolerance setting provisions
of section 406 are brought into operation only by clause (2)(A) of
section 402(a), which provides that a food shall be deemed adulter-
ated "if it bears or contains any added poisonous or added deleter-
ious substance (other than one which is . . . (ii) a food additive
.) which is unsafe within the meaning of [section 406] . .. ."110
unsafe, notwithstanding §§ 406 and 409 of the Act, if the pesticide had been used on the raw
agricultural commodity pursuant to a tolerance or exemption granted under § 408. The
argument could be made that the proviso constitutes an independent basis for concluding
that Congress considered pesticide residues to be food additives, and the opinion is unclear
concerning the extent to which the court relied on this inference. 502 F.2d at 722. The
inference is not compelling; the language of the proviso suggests that it applies only to
agricultural products upon which pesticides were intentionally used, not those in which the
presence of the residues is due simply to pervasive environmental contamination. See 21 VILL.
L. Rav. 140, 149-50 (1975); note 114 infra.
'o' See note 100 supra.
's 502 F.2d at 722. Accord, United States v. City Smoked Fish Co., No. 33,669 (E.D.
Mich. 1970).
1 Dieldrin is carcinogenic in five strains of mice and probably in the rat. See Environ-
mental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 510 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir.
1975).
DDT is also carcinogenic in mice. See Innes, Bioassay of Pesticides and Industrial Chem-
icals for Tumorigenicity in Mice: A Preliminary Note, 42 J. NAT'L CANCER INsT. 1101 (1969);
Kemeny & Tarian, Investigations on the Effects of Chemically Administered Small Amounts
of DDT in Mice, 22 EXPERiENTIA 748 (1966).
'' See R. CARSON, SILENT SPRING 30-31 (1962).
See Report of the Secretary's Commission on Pesticides and Their Relationship to
Environmental Health, supra note 89, at 14.
'" See 39 Fed. Reg. 42743, 42744-45 (1974).
' 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(2)(A) (1970).
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Food containing food additives, on the other hand, is deemed adul-
terated if the additive is unsafe within the meaning of section 409.111
The statute establishes an independent scheme for the regulation of
food additives; any tolerances for unsafe food additives must be
established pursuant to a section 409 regulation.11 2 The anticancer
clause in section 409, of course, flatly forbids the Secretary to issue
a regulation permitting the use of carcinogenic food additives.113
It does not appear, however, that Congress intended to include
environmental contaminants not used by the manufacturer or pro-
cessor within the definition of food additives.'14 Section 201(s) de-
21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(2)(C) (1970).
"1 The Supreme Court faced a similar issue in Flemming v. Florida Citrus Exchange,
358 U.S. 153 (1958). In that case processors claimed that § 406 authorized the Secretary to
establish tolerances for the use of coal tar colors upon oranges, even if the colors in question
were not certified harmless as then required by § 402(c) of the Act. The Court rejected this
claim. The tolerance setting authority of § 406, the Court ruled, did not permit the Secretary
to establish tolerances for uncertified food colors in the teeth of the § 402(c) prohibition
against the use of uncertified colors, Id. at 166.
"' See text and notes at notes 30-33 supra.
'" The Ewig Brothers court noted the proviso to § 402(a)(2)(C) that deals specifically
with pesticide residues in processed agricultural commodities, and read this as evidence that
the food additive definition is broad enough to include pesticide residues in processed food.
Prior to 1958 only raw agricultural commodities could be considered adulterated as a matter
of law. Section 408 of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 346a (1970), permits the setting of tolerances for
residues in the raw agricultural commodity. In 1958 the per se concept was extended by the
Food Additives Amendment. The purpose of the proviso to § 402(a)(2)(C) was to extend the
tolerance prescribed for the raw commodity to the processed commodity, by providing that
residues in processed commodities shall not be deemed unsafe "if. . . the concentration of
such residue in the processed food when ready to eat is not greater than the tolerance pre-
scribed for the raw agricultural commodity." 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(2)(C) (1970). In the court's
view, the fact that this proviso was needed is evidence that Congress felt that pesticide
residues in the processed commodity were food additives within the meaning of § 409: in the
absence of special provision allowing the marketing of processed commodities containing
pesticide residues, such commodities would be subject to per se treatment under § 409.
Even if Congress felt that residues in a processed commodity of pesticides used "in or
on" the raw commodity were food additives, however, it does not follow that all pesticide
residues in any food commodity are food additives, regardless of the means by which the
residue entered the processed food. Indeed it is most curious that Congress, if it thought that
all pesticide residues in all commodities were food additives, limited the protection of the
proviso to those processed commodities which were themselves treated with pesticides in the
raw stage. Were all pesticide residues to be considered food additives, the anomaly would
arise that processed commodities directly treated with pesticides would be regulated under
§ 408, under which the government bears the burden of providing unfitness, while those
processed commodities contaminated via the food pyramids could be marketed only after the
processor secured a regulation under § 409. Congress could not have intended to place a
heavier burden on the processor of foods not treated with pesticides than on the processor of
directly treated foods, for the latter has far greater control over the condition of the commodi-
ties he purchases. Although the existence of a problem may be inferred from the congressional
response, the failure of Congress to remedy an almost identical problem of vaster implications
perhaps suggests the nonexistence of the greater problem; suggests, that is, that environmen-
tal contaminants not intentionally used in or on the commodity itself are not food additives.
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fines food additives as substances "the intended use of which" may
reasonably be expected to result in the substances becoming a com-
ponent of food, and explains that this definition includes "any sub-
stance intended for use in producing, manufacturing, packing, pro-
cessing, preparing, treating, packaging, transporting, or holding
food. ... "5 The Ewig Brothers court felt that a substance in food
is a "food additive" if that substance has been used at any point
by any person for the purposes of food production. This interpreta-
tion would lead to the anomalous result that fish contaminated with
pesticides used in the production of agricultural commodities would
be contaminated as a matter of law under section 409116 but fish
contaminated with industrial effluents would not. The more plausi-
ble interpretation is that the "intended use" to which the statute
refers is that of the manufacturer or processor of the food commodity
in which the substance is found. Section 409 regulates food additives
by means of a premarketing mechanism designed to establish the
safe levels at which a manufacturer or processor may use additives.
The user must petition for a regulation permitting its use, and is
responsible for bringing such use into conformity with the terms of
the governing regulation.11 7 If the processor of the commodity in
question does not use the foreign substance, the substance is not
amenable to the regulatory scheme of section 409, for the agency
cannot formulate regulations prescribing the terms and conditions
of the use of a substance that the processor does not use. The agency
has ample authority, under sections 402 and 406, to remove from the
market any food adulterated by contaminants that enter the food
by accident or through the ecological pyramids."'
"' 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (1970).
'" If a substance is a "food additive" it is deemed unsafe "with respect to any particular
use or intended use" in the absence of a regulation prescribing the terms of its use. FDCA §
409(a), 21 U.S.C. § 348(a) (1970).
,,7 Thus one commentator has argued:
It seems inconsistent with the legislative purpose to maintain that any substance is a
food additive, regardless of whether its use in the distributive chain was reasonably
foreseeable since in such cases there would be no possibility of pretesting to determine
a safe amount. Thus, accidental additives, such as detergents used to clean the floors of
the plant, which might conceivably but unexpectedly become components of the food,
were exempted from the pretesting requirements since industry could have no way of
either knowing or controlling the amounts which might eventually contaminate the food.
21 Vi.. L. REv. 140, 148-49 n.56 (1975). The note author emphasizes foreseeability, but the
crucial issue seems to be control. Even if it can be reasonably foreseen that a product will be
contaminated by DDT, for example, as a result of its ubiquity in the food pyramids, the
contamination is nevertheless not a food additive, for it is not "used" on the product and
therefore is not amenable to § 409 pretesting.
"' See text and note at note 16 supra.
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The "food additive" definition is perhaps worded broadly
enough to encompass certain kinds of environmental contaminants.
If a processor or packer purposely uses a contaminant in such a way
as to permit the contaminant to enter the food commodity, the
processor's use of the contaminant is amenable to section 409 regu-
lation. For example, processors who use packaging paper contami-
nated with polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) should be subject to
section 409 regulation. PCBs, known carcinogens' 9 found in certain
types of food packaging paper, can enter food by migrating from the
surrounding paper. The presence of PCBs in certain types of paper
is evidently due to environmental contamination. 1 0 The use of pack-
aging material containing PCBs is clearly an intended use of the
paper in the distributive process that can reasonably be expected
to result in the PCBs becoming a component of the food. PCBs in
packaging paper therefore might be considered food additives so
that the FDA could prohibit the use of such paper under conditions
enabling PCB migration.
In general, however, foods containing environmentally perva-
sive carcinogens, or carcinogens produced through natural pro-
cesses, such as fungus growth,"' are not subject to the anticancer
proviso of section 409(c)(3)(A). Such contaminated food must be
regulated as food containing added poisonous substances under sec-
tion 402(a)(1)22 or 402(a)(2)(A).2 3 Under these sections of the stat-
"I See Nagasaki, Tomii, Mega, Marugami & Ito, Hepatocarcinogenicity of Polychlori-
nated Biphenyls in Mice, 63 GANN 805 (1972). See also Environmental Defense Fund
Citizen Petition on PCB's (FDA, November 21, 1975). See generally Ueda, Toxicological
Aspects I, The Toxicity of PCBs in PCB PoIsoNING AND POLLUION 32 (K. Higuchi ed. 1976).
"I See 39 Fed. Reg. 42743 (1974); In the Matter of Polychlorinated Biphenyls, No. FDC
82 (FDA 1975).
2I See text and notes at notes 129-34 infra.
21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(1) (1970).
'2 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(2)(A) (1970). Substances which are "added" but are not considered
food additives are regulated under §§ 402 and 406 of the Act. A few judicial decisions have
attempted to determine whether a substance was "added." In United States v. 1,600,800
Pounds of White Corn, Civil No. T-4173 (D. Kan. Dec. 18, 1970), the court held that since
aflatoxin is not a natural constituent of corn, it must be considered an added substance. The
court recognized that aflatoxin is the byproduct of a mold that grows from spores not found
on corn prior to harvesting. In United States v. 1232 Cases of American Beauty Brand
Oysters, 43 F. Supp. 749 (W.D. Mo. 1942), the court held that shell fragments in cans of
oysters were "not added" substances under § 402(a)(1), and that tolerances for shell frag-
ments could therefore not be issued under § 406. The court stated that the shell fragments
were "not artificially added for the purpose of growth or to aid in the processing operations."
Id. at 750. The FDA has asserted that the word "added" refers not only to substances
purposely added, but to all substances not inherent in nature. See 39 Fed. Reg. 42743, 42744
(1974). That position received judicial approval in United States v. An Article of Food Consis-
ting of Cartons of Swordfish, 395 F. Supp. 1184 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (mercury in swordfish held
an added substance). Although it may be difficult in some cases to determine if a substance
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ute, the FDA bears the burden of establishing the harmfulness of
the food or of the ingredient,124 and tolerance levels can be estab-
lished under section 406 for necessary or unavoidable carcinogenic
substances. The FDA presently sets tolerances for such substances,
but does not bear the burden of proving the harmfulness of food
containing environmental carcinogens, since such substances are
deemed unsafe under section 409 in the absence of a regulation
specifying the permissible terms of their use. Thus the agency shifts
the burden of proof to manufacturers by treating environmerital
carcinogens in food as food additives while avoiding the mandate of
the anticancer proviso in section 409.
The manner of regulating the presence in food of environmen-
tally ubiquitous carcinogens that has emerged is rather eccentric,
but not unsatisfactory in policy. The FDA is unlikely to take the
drastic action with respect to such carcinogens that Ewig Brothers
seems to require-for essentially the same reason the agency has
refused to apply the anticancer clause of section 409 to nitrites and
selenium.125 Congress has never squarely addressed the problem of
how to regulate carcinogenic food additives that are truly unavoid-
able or that are essential in the production of food. If the presence
in food of substances such as DDT or selenium is to be systemati-
cally regulated, Congress, not the agency, should strike the funda-
mental balance of social costs and benefits. But until basic legisla-
tive decisions are made and standards erected, the FDA has no
choice but to muddle through, backing and filling as events require.
Assuming that the Ewig Brothers decision and the FDA posi-
tion will remain the law, at least for the near future, it is imperative
that the criteria for determining unavoidability, as well as the stan-
dards for regulating unavoidable substances, comport with the gen-
eral public health purposes of the Act. Acting under section 406, the
FDA now permits the use of packaging paper containing PCBs, on
the theory that PCB migration is unavoidable. 126 The agency, how-
ever, has admitted that PCB migration can be avoided by interpos-
ing a barrier between the packaging paper and the food.2' The con-
in food is "inherent in nature," see Note, Health Regulation of Naturally Hazardous Foods:
The FDA Ban on Swordfish, 85 H-Av. L. RaV. 1025, 1030-32 (1972), the presence of pesticide
residues in food is undeniably the result of man's use of the pesticide.
124 See note 16 supra.
" Selenium and nitrites are clearly food additives. By a restrictive interpretation of the
term "induce" in the anticancer clause, the FDA regulates selenium and nitrites under the
safety clause. See text and notes at notes 39-55 supra.
In 21 C.F.R. § 109.30 (1977).
' See 38 Fed. Reg. 18096, 18100 (1973).
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cept of unavoidability should not be thus stretched for the purpose
of avoiding the mandate of the anticancer clause."'
Furthermore, the level of adulteration considered unavoidable
should not necessarily be dictated by the standards the food indus-
try has set for itself. The FDA, in its proposed regulation of afla-
toxin, a contaminant of peanuts, chose a 15 p.p.b. tolerance leve1 2
primarily, it appears, because that was thought to be "a level at
which manufacturers have the capability to monitor their products
during processing and to ensure that the finished product complies
with the tolerance"'3 ° -even though eleven of the twelve major
producers of peanut prooucts could meet a 10 p.p.b. tolerance in 90
percent of their products.' 3 ' Aflatoxin is a potent carcinogen'3 2 pro-
duced by a type of ihold that grows on peanuts. 133 By immediately
drying and properly storing the harvested peanuts manufacturers
could substantially reduce the production of aflatoxin. 34 The FDA
elevated industry convenience and security over public health con-
siderations by refusing to adopt an industry-leading standard.
Judge Learned Hand's classic statement concerning the deference
due industry usage under the law of torts seems apposite in this
context:
[I]n most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common prud-
ence; but strictly it is never its measure; a whole calling may
have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available de-
vices. It may never set its own test, however persuasive be its
'2 Insofar as practicable, the agency should preserve the integrity of the Food Additives
Amendment as an independent regulatory scheme prescribing more stringent safety stan-
dards than those contained in the general "poisonous and deleterious" sections of the Act.
Cf. Continental Chemiste Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 461 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1972) (dictum that
subsequent to the passage of the Food Additives Amendment, if a product constitutes a "food
additive" it is excluded from the "poisonous" or "deleterious" category).
1" 39 Fed. Reg. 42748, 42750 (1974). The FDA proposes to establish a § 406 tolerance on
the ground that aflatoxin contamination is unavoidable.
13 Id.
131 Id.
12 Aflatoxin induces tumors in rats when fed 1 p.p.b. of their daily diet. See Wogan,
et al., Carcinogenic Effects of Low Dietary Levels of Aflatoxin B' in Rats, 12 FOOD Cos.
ToxICOLoGY 681 (1974). In other experiments one hundred per cent of the rats fed aflatoxin
as 15 p.p.b. of their daily diet developed tumors. See Wogan & Newbern, Dose-Response
Characteristics of Aflatoxin B1 Carcinogenesis in the Rat, 27 CANCER RESEARCH 2370 (1967).
For further discussion of the carcinogenicity of aflatoxin, see Health Research Group, Com-
ment on Fed. Reg. Proposals (Dec. 6, 1974) (FDA, 1974).
132 See NAT'L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, TOxICANTs OCCURRING NATURALLY IN FOOD 26 (1966).
It was first isolated when 100,000 turkeys died in England from "Turkey X" disease. R. Suss.,
V. KIwzEL, J. SCRIBNER, CANCER 7 (1973).
131 See Ashworth, Schroeder & Langley, Aflatoxins: Environmental Factors Governing
Occurrence in Spanish Peanuts, 148 SCIENCE 1228 (1965).
[44:817
Anticancer Clauses of FDCA
usages . . . . [T]here are precautions so imperative that even
their universal disregard will not excuse their omission. '35
B. Food Additives: The Statutory Exceptions
The two statutory exceptions from the food additive definition
raise special problems. Congress specifically excepted from the anti-
cancer clause substances that experts "generally recognize as safe"
(GRAS). 3 The purpose of the GRAS exception was to exempt com-
mon additives such as salt, sugar, and vinegar from the pretesting
requirement of section 409.137 Also excepted were substances granted
a sanction prior to the enactment of the Food Additives Amend-
ment.'38 Prior sanctions were FDA informal opinions acknowledging
the safety of chemicals intended for use in food.'39
Since GRAS additives and additives granted a prior sanction
are regulated under the "poisonous and deleterious" sections of the
Act, these statutory exceptions might appear to create substantial
impediments to the effective implementation of the anticancer
clause. Both GRAS and prior sanction additives, however, can be
withdrawn. The GRAS exception requires a general consensus
among scientists that the exempted substance is safe. Any suspicion
' The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662 (1932) (cited
in Consumers Union, Poisonous or Deleterious Substances in Food; Proposed Tolerance for
Aflatoxins in Shelled Peanuts and Peanut Products and Lead in Evaporated Milk and Pro-
posed Action Level for Mercury in Fish and Shellfish (Comments on Proposed Rulemaking,
March 6, 1975)).
' FDCA § 201(s), 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (1970).
"= FOOD DRUG Cos. L. REP. (CCH) 55,051.40 (HEW Release 135, Sept. 10, 1958). There
were approximately 180 GRAS substances at the time of the Amendment's enactment. FOOD
DRUG Cos. L. REP. (CCH) 55,051.44 (HEW Release L. 79, Nov. 20, 1959). The number has
grown to approximately 675. Spiher, Food Ingredient Review, FDA CONSuMER, June, 1974,
at 23. There is not a single GRAS list, although the FDA has published a partial list. See 21
C.F.R. § 121.101 (1975). Substances not included on this list are not automatically classified
as food additives. Manufacturers may form their own conclusion whether a substance is
GRAS; if they are in error, the.food containing such additives will be considered adulterated.
See 14 FOOD DRUG Cos. L.J. 9 (1959). Several groups, including the flavor, the chewing gum,
and the brewing industries, have published lists. The FDA has presumed some substances
to be GRAS without publication, and has issued "no objection letters," usually unpublished,
on other substances. See generally The Use of Substances "Generally Recognized as Safe"
(July 20, 1973) (unpublished FDA release).
"' FDCA § 201(s)(4); 21 U.S.C. § 321(s)(4) (1970).
13, The number of prior sanction letters has been estimated to be between one and ten
thousand. See Turner, supra note 5, at 312. Many of the sanctions that have been granted
cannot be ascertained because of the destruction of old records and the retirement of person-
nel from the FDA. 37 Fed. Reg. 16407 (1972). The FDA now attempts to publish all prior
sanctions as they become known, see 21 C.F.R. § 121.2000 (1976), and to replace old prior
sanctions with "qualified and current opinions." See 21 C.F.R. § 121.11 (1976). For a discus-
sion of the effect of these regulations, see FOOD CHEMcAL Nsws, April 13, 1970, at 39.
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that an additive may induce cancer should be sufficient to prevent
it from being "generally recognized as safe." ' Revocation of a prior
sanction is more difficult. Such sanctions can be withdrawn only
under the safety standards of sections 402 and 406. Those standards
place on the FDA the burden of showing that the substance may be
injurious to health; thus, withdrawal could not be effected on the
basis of inconclusive data."1 A clear demonstration that a substance
is carcinogenic, however, should suffice for revocation of a prior
sanction.'42
C. Animal Drugs: The DES Amendment
The DES Amendment "3 authorizes the FDA to approve the use
of any carcinogenic animal drug if, after testing of the drug by
"methods approved by the Secretary," no residue of the drug can
be found in any edible portion of the animal. The clause was en-
acted in 1962 to permit the continued use of diethylstilbestrol
(DES)."' At that time, the carcinogenicity of DES was well estab-
lished, "I but there was no evidence that cattle to which the drug had
140 For example, saccharin was withdrawn from the GRAS list in 1971 on the basis of
evidence suggestive of its carcinogenicity. 21 C.F.R. § 121.101 (1970). The regulation permit-
ted continued use within limitations while further tests were being conducted. 36 Fed. Reg.
12109 (1971).
" See T. CHRISTOPHER & W. GOODRICH, supra note 16, at 531.
"4 The prior sanction status of safrole was revoked after evidence clearly demonstrated
its carcinogenicity. 25 Fed. Reg. 12412 (1960). See generally Lehman, Report on Safrole, 25
Q. BuLL. ASS'N FOOD & DRUG OFICIAS 194 (1961).
" FDCA § 512(d)(1)(H), 21 U.S.C. § 360b(d)(1)(H) (1970).
24 DES is a synthetic estrogen widely used either as a food additive or as implanted
pellets to increase the growth rate of ruminants. See generally Burroughs, Culbertson, Chang,
Hale & Homeyer, The Influence of Oral Administration of Diethylstilbestrol to Beef Cattle,
14 J. ANimAL Sci. 1015 (1955).
The DES Amendment, although drafted with specific reference to diethylstilbestrol,
applies to all animal drugs. Issues similar to those presented in the DES cases are arising
with respect to a group of drugs known as nitrofurans. There are four nitrofurans used in food-
producing animals: nitrofurazone, nihydrazone, furazolidone, and furaltadone. Like DES,
nitrofurans are carcinogenic. Office of the Comptroller General, Use of Cancer-Causing Drugs
in Food-Producing Animals May Pose Public Health Hazard: The Case of Nitrofurans (Feb-
ruary 25, 1976); 41 Fed. Reg. 19906 (1976); 41 Fed. Reg. 34884 (1976); In the Matter of
Furazolidone, No. 76N-0172 (FDA, August, 1976).
24 See, e.g., Gusberg, Precursors of Corpus Carcinoma, Estrogens and Adenomatous
Hyperplasia, 54 AM. J. OBSTETRIcS & GYNoCOLOGY, 905 (1947); Shimkin & Grady, Toxic and
Carcinogenic Effects of Stilbestrol in Strain C3H Male Mice, 2 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 55
(1941). In 1971, Herbst reported seven cases of vaginal adenocarcinoma in daughters of
women who had taken DES during pregnancy for threatened abortion. Herbst, Ulfelder &
Puskanzer, Adenocarcinoma of Maternal Stilbestrol Treatment with Tumor Appearance in
Young Women, 284 NEw ENG. J. MED. 878 (1971). About 80 additional cases have been
reported. Hernonin, Diethylstilbbstrol in Pregnancy: Frequency of Exposure and Usage
Patterns, 31 CANCER 573 (1973).
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been administered retained any residue of DES after slaughter.
Since the enactment of the DES Amendment, the analytical
methods for detecting residues have improved dramatically." 6 After
the Department of Agriculture in 1972 detected what appeared to
be DES residues in beef, the FDA attempted to remove DES from
the market.'47 In Hess & Clark, Division of Rhodia, Inc. v. FDA,','
the D.C. Circuit vacated the withdrawal on the grounds that the
agency had not provided the manufacturers an adequate opportun-
ity for a hearing, and remanded the case to the FDA. Following
remand, the FDA announced a hearing on its proposal to withdraw
the prior approval of DES. 4'
The main controversy in that hearing will center on whether the
substances found in DES-treated animals are "residues" within the
meaning of the statute. Drugs may be chemically altered after
ingestion and the substance detected in the tissues of slaughtered
animals may be something quite different from the administered
drug.'50 The manufacturers of DES argue that "a residue is the
remainder of the original substance and the term 'residue' should
not be used to describe new compounds formed from the original
substance."' 5' They claim that the residue contained in the animal
tissues is a metabolite of DES, DES-monoglucuranide, and assert
that the metabolite, unlike free DES, is not carcinogenic.' 2
The statute and legislative history leave unclear whether Con-
gress intended metabolites to be included within the term
"residues," or whether metabolites must be independently evalu-
ated for carcinogenicity. As a practical matter, metabolites are often
present in trace amounts and can be difficult to identify, isolate,
"I In 1962 the detection of a few parts per million (the mass ratio of the constituent to
its parent specimen) was considered rare. Today, the detection of a few parts per trillion can
be achieved in some instances. For example, the bioassay method used to detect DES in the
1950's reached a sensitivity of 50 p.p.b. In the 1960's, the use of gas chromatography permit-
ted detection of 5 p.p.b. Recently, radioimmunoassay has been able to detect 0.5 p.p.b. See
1975 Appropriations Hearings, supra note 83, at 7.
"7 For the chronology of events that led to the attempted withdrawal of DES, see Byer-
ley, So Are They All-All Honorable Men: A Review of the DES Revocation Cases to Date,
29 FooD DRUG Cos. L.J. 460 (1974).
"' 495 F.2d 975 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
!4, 41 Fed. Reg. 52105 (1976).
" See generally Morrison & Munro, Appraisal of the Significance to Man of Drug Resi-
dues in Edible Animal Products, in NAT'L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, THE USE OF DRUGs IN ANMAL
FEEos 255-69 (1969).
" Affidavit of Bernard Kliman, M.D., at 2, In the Matter of Diethylstilbestrol, No. 76N-
0002 (FDA, Feb. 9, 1976).
I52 Written Appearance and Request for Hearing of Vineland Laboratories, Inc., at 8, In
the Matter of Diethylstilbestrol, No. 76N-0002 (FDA, Feb. 11, 1976).
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and test.'53 If scientific evidence establishes a significant possibility
that metabolites have the carcinogenic properties of their parent
chemicals and that individual testing is not practical, the FDA
would be justified in establishing a presumption that such metabol-
ites fall within the anticancer clause. The DES Amendment granted
an exception to the anticancer clause for known carcinogens only on
the assumption that the use of such carcinogens would not result in
human ingestion of carcinogenic chemicals; if there is evidence that
the assumption is incorrect, the DES exception should not apply.
On the other hand, it would not be inconsistent with the purpose of
the DES Amendment to permit the use of a drug that leaves a
metabolite in the slaughtered animal so long as there is convincing
evidence that the metabolite is not itself carcinogenic.
A second issue crucial to the proper administration of the DES
Amendment concerns testing methods. The statute prescribes that
the methods of detecting residues shall be those "approved by the
Secretary." It has been argued, therefore, that the law does not
require the use of the most sensitive method of analysis.'54 At the
time of enactment of the Amendment, Congress recognized that the
ability to measure a "zero" quantity of residue was limited by the
sensitivity of the method employed.'55 However, there is no indica-
tion that Congress purposely sanctioned the presence of minute
quantities of residues in human food. Congress had no intention of
weakening the anticancer clauses; indeed, the legislators were ex-
pressly assured that the DES Amendment would not compromise
"the consumer protection now afforded by [the anticancer] provi-
sion.""' Assurance was made that the "basic principle of the anti-
cancer provision"-the no-threshold hypothesis-would "remain
unimpaired."' 5 The legislative history of the DES Amendment thus
suggests that use of the most sensitive method of analysis should be
required under the Amendment.
The FDA has expressed dismay at the prospect of requiring the
" See Kolbye & Perez, supra note 58, at 3.
"' See, e.g., CONG. REc. H5945 (daily ed. June 16, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Whitten):
"Testimony before the committee has highlighted the fact that the Secretary of HEW is
charged with the responsibility of approving a method for the measurement of residues. The
law does not require the present practice of using the most sensitive method available."
" See 108 CONG. Rac. 21077 (1962).
"' The quotation in the text is from a section by section analysis of H.R 11581 forwarded
to the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce in 1962 by the HEW Secretary,
cited in Regulation of Diethylstilbestrol (DES): Hearings before the Intergovernmental Rela-
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most sensitive method of detection. ' A policy of continually adopt-
ing new methods of detection as such methods are developed might
frustrate the hope, expressed in 1962 by the Secretary of HEW, that
statutory authority to prescribe detection methods could be used to
ensure that "industry, laboratory technicians, and enforcement offi-
cials [will] have a common understanding with the Food and Drug
Administration as to the methods of assay that will be recognized
by us on which we intend to rely in resolving the question of resi-
due."'59 But the Secretary did recognize that only reasonable cer-
tainty could be achieved because "such regulations may from time
to time be changed as new scientific developments demonstrate a
need for change."1 0
The FDA has recently promulgated regulations adopting sensi-
tivity of the method principles (SOM) under its authority to pre-
scribe the methods to be used in detecting residues. 6' The SOM
principles do not specify that a certain analytic method be used in
testing for residues, but instead establish for each drug a level of
residue exposure that the agency considers "safe" and require that
the assay method chosen be capable of measuring to the defined
level.'6 2 The theoretical calculation by which the safety level is de-
l" FDA Commissioner Schmidt has recently stated that mandatory use of the most
sensitive method "means that we will be chasing a receding zero and some idiot in some lab
will come up with something sensitive to parts quintillion, and on our policy it says we will
adopt it." National Advisory Food and Drug Committee, FDA, Transcript of Proceedings of
June 29-30, 1976, at 2-56 (remarks of Alexander Schmidt, FDA Commissioner).
01 1975 Appropriations Hearings, supra note 83, at 204 (report by Secretary of HEW to
the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, reprinted from H.R. REP. No. 2464,
87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960)).
"' Id. at 204.
"' 38 Fed. Reg. 19226 (1973); 42 Fed. Reg. 10412 (1977) (codified at 21 C.F.R. §§ 500.80-
.98 (1977)). FDA has indicated its intention to apply the SOM rules to nitrofurans. See 41
Fed. Reg. 19906 (1976); 41 Fed. Reg. 34884 (1976). For a general discussion of these proposed
regulations, see Robens, Criteria for Acceptable Methods to Detect Drug Residues, 29 FoOD
DauG Cos. L.J. 39 (1974).
"2 As outlined in the FoOD & DRUG LE'TR, September 3, 1976, at 3, the following steps
would be required of a manufacturer who wishes to market an animal drug that is a suspected
carcinogen:
[1] Assess total residues in edible products and their depletion times, in order to
ascertain probable human consumption.
[2] Determine appropriate testing in laboratory animals to estimate the cumulative
effects of human exposure to the residues.
[3] Use dose-response data in test animals to extrapolate to a level of residue exposure
that FDA considers insignificant and posing essentially no risk of cancer.
[4] Determine the animal tissue from which the residues require the longest time to
deplete to safe levels, and the compound the assay must measure to assure that no
unsafe residues occur.
[5] Develop a practicable method of analysis to assure that total residues in the daily
diet of humans do not exceed the safe level.
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termined is based on an estimate of the quantity of the drug that
would yield a one in one million chance of producing cancer.' 3
This statistical extrapolation method is fraught with difficul-
ties. Adoption of a theoretical estimate of safety for a disease whose
mechanisms of induction are so little understood must be viewed
with skepticism. No theoretical estimate can take into account
either the variability of human susceptibility to carcinogens or the
individual hormonal and immunological mechanisms that affect the
growth of tumors once they have been initiated.' 4 Moreover, the
assumption that science can estimate the risk that a chemical will
cause cancer is fundamentally at odds with the no-threshold hy-
pothesis. The difficulties associated with any statistical extrapola-
tion method reinforce the conclusion that it is better and more
consistent with the policy of the Delaney clause to require the most
sensitive method of detection that is both reliable and reproducible.
CONCLUSION
This comment has examined several problems that have arisen
in the application of the anticancer clauses. The problems are diffi-
cult, but not insurmountable. Full implementation of the antican-
cer policy requires a substantial effort from the FDA, particularly
in formulating scientific standards to guide legal judgments. The
strictly legal problems-problems of statutory interpretation-may
require legislative attention, particularly in the area of regulating
the marketing of food contaminated by environmental carcinogens
such as DDT. The FDA, perhaps with some justification, has
strayed from the strict anticancer policy of the Act in certain re-
spects. Legislative clarification would provide the agency with
much needed guidance in its task of protecting the public health.
David A. Kessler
[6] Demonstrate that the product label can prescribe practical conditions of use to
assure there will be no unsafe residues.
"9 42 Fed. Reg. 10412, 10431 (1977) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 500.87 (1977)). The method
of extrapolation is based upon Mantel & Bryan, "Safety" Testing of Carcinogenic Agents, 27
J. NAT'L CANcER INsT. 455 (1961); Mantel, et at., An Improved Mantel-Bryan Procedure for
"Safety" Testing of Carcinogens, 35 CANCER REsEARCH 865 (1975).
"I4 See Health Research Group, Comments on the Proposed FDA Regulation
"Compounds Used in Food Producing Animals" (Sept. 17, 1973).
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